Related to my post re:Venezuela, specifically on the attack on the boat north of Trinidad & Tobago — an article from Talking Points Memo discussing, in part, heat coming down on the flag officer in command of the operators — the authors point out that they had signals intelligence that indicated the boat was engaged in narcotics trafficking ops.

I’m worried that the intelligence community may receive some blowback about the incident. While I think it’s perfectly reasonable to wonder what the intel has to do with the pull of the trigger — i.e., the operators killed the crew regardless of why they were deployed — what can happen in political “blamestorming” is anybody’s guess.

To me, I think there’s a clear delineation between the intel the community provides and the actions taken based upon it. The intel didn’t direct special operators to blow the shit out of the boat. The intel only indicated that they were possibly/probably transporting illegal drugs. That seems ample reason to leave the intel community out of the whole debacle. And I’m fairly confident that argument will be made.

But in the meantime, I suspect there have been some relatively sleepless nights lately for both the operators who produced the intel and the operators on-site. And honestly, this old Chief feels for them both.

I respect the popular position that the special operators should have refused the order to fire on the vessel, but I ask that one considers this: the SOs who held the weapons were probably junior enlisted sailors. We’re talking about E-4s and E-5s who aren’t really paid or trained to think independently outside of SOP. If they’re told to shoot, by God they’ll shoot. It’s a function of training. Military discipline would fall apart if the enlisted stopped doing what they’re told; there’s no such thing as “that’s not in my job description” in that environment. The enlisted troops likely weren’t the ones to make the go/no-go decision on gunning down the crew. As a career military man, I’m looking more in the direction of the junior officer in charge of the op on-site — the butter bar or silver bar leading the squad. (non-Mustang Butter bars are expected to be du– expected to be inexperienced.) To me, that’s where the order should have been countermanded. The order never should have reached PO Baggadoughnuts’ ears. Don’t blame the kid.

As for the operators who produced the intel, holy Hell. I can only imagine the scrutiny. Again, probably processed by anybody from SN (E-3) up to Petty Officer Second Class (E-5). This kid now has heat coming onto him/her from the entire chain of command: the CO gets a call from HQ; the Department Head gets called in to see the skipper; the Div O gets called in to see the Department Head; the CMC probably gets engaged, and he’s probably salty AF, so he’ll get a piece of the kid directly AND call in the entire crew who processed everything despite being in the middle of a double-back*. And he’s going to want to see everything on the case immediately. And loudly. An E-3 getting screamed at by an E-9 is not a pretty sight. Trust. If the data seems legit, the CMC can go back to the beautiful people and defend SN Schmuckatelli and that should be the end of it. But the kid’s gonna have a target on his/her back for a little while. And I’d bet dollars to doughnuts this has already happened.

So please… don’t blame the kids. It’s not their fault. If you’re looking to place blame, do it further up the chain.

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* Perhaps an introduction to military jargon is in order here. The term Mustang refers to a military officer who received a commission after having come up through the enlisted ranks. A “butter bar” is an O-1, the most junior of the commissioned officer corps. “Butter bar” refers to the single gold bar collar devices they wear. One can always tell a freshly minted Mustang officer because they’re wearing a butter bar and also a chest full of ribbons. CMC refers to a Command Master Chief; a Master Chief is an E-9, the highest enlisted rank. The Command Master Chief is the Master Chief with the most seniority at a command. Finally, a double-back refers to back-to-back shifts on duty. In certain watchstanding rotations, one can stand an 8-hour watch, be off for 8 hours, then back on for another 8. The two shifts are called a “double-back.” And yes, I have been called in despite being on my off time between two watches.